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Abstract
In China, the study of history has never been a detached 
academic pursuit, as it has always been indistinguishable 
from political directions. Chinese political leaders have 
been unable to adopt a disinterested approach towards 
history, be it distant or contemporary. On the other hand, 
Western historians interpret Chinese history from their 
own point of view, and they often view Chinese history 
as an extension of Western history. Often, they have 
been preoccupied with the concern to explain or justify 
their own record or involvement rather than to produce 
an objective account, especially in regard to the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ history of China. 
This study questions the conventional approach to China’s 
past, be that of a Confucian, a Communist or a Western 
ethnocentric historiographer. It explores the possibility 
of establishing a “Chinese experience-based” approach 
while maintaining “impartiality and neutrality”, looking to 
historical studies outside of China to achieve this.
Key words: Chinese history; Historiography; History 
teaching methodology
Xiangshu FANG, Lijun BI (2013). Teaching Chinese History: 
The Issue of Approach. Higher Education of Social Science, 
4(2), 25-29. Available from: http://www.cscanada.net/index.
p h p / h e s s / a r t i c l e / v i e w /  j . h e s s . 1 9 2 7 0 2 4 0 2 0 1 3 0 4 0 2 . 3 7 0 2 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/ j.hess.1927024020130402.3702
INTRODUCTION
When we teach Chinese history and explore China’s past, 
we are always faced with the issue of “approach”. A useful 
method to help students learn history is to present it as a 
set of questions, instead of a set of answers. What we are 
able to say about a period or an event depends not only 
on the sources available, but also on the questions we ask 
(Ebrey, Walthall & Palais, 2006). Most of the questions, 
even those that look quite simple, are not easy to answer, 
and students should not be able to answer them simply by 
reading the set materials handed to them in the classroom. 
They are “real” questions, interesting and exciting enough 
to motivate historians to go through knotty materials in 
order to find answers.
People who are not historians often think of history as 
the facts about the past. Yes, while facts are a large part 
of history, they have to be interpreted from conflicting 
and sometimes unintelligible voices. It is the task of 
the historian to reach back into the past through this 
incoherent clutter of facts to attempt to figure out an 
object account. Although there are rules of evidence to 
keep historians honest while trying to present historical 
“truth”, it is inevitable that subjective element enters into 
all historical scholarship. Which facts we choose, which 
documents we rely upon, and indeed what questions we 
ask and under what assumptions we operate all influence 
and taint our interpretation and the subsequent teaching 
and learning in the classroom.
1.  IS CHINESE HISTORY BEST KNOWN 
IN CHINA?
The first question we ask our students is a “real” question 
that still puzzles us to this day: Is Chinese history best 
known in China? All our students would unanimously say: 
Yes, of course, just like Australian history is best known 
in Australia and American history is best known in the 
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USA. While we quite agree, the question is not as simple 
as it seems to be. 
The Chinese people have been obsessed with their 
history for as long as the history itself. In all dynastic 
primers, a key component was to pass the knowledge 
of this history to the young succinctly and efficiently. A 
thorough knowledge of history was crucial to the success 
in the imperial civil service examinations, but history was 
not to be studied but memorized. For example, the most 
commonly used elementary textbook in dynastic China, 
the Three Character Classic, written by a Song dynasty 
scholar Wang Yinglin (1223–1296) contains the following 
summary of nearly four thousand years of Chinese 
history:  
The classics and the philosophers mastered,
read the histories. 
Examine the connection between the eras;
know the ends and the beginnings.
From Xi and Nong, to the Yellow Emperor, 
they are called the Three Sovereigns, 
who lived in ancient times.
Tang and Yu, called the Two Emperors, 
one abdicated after the other 
and theirs was called the Age of Prosperity.
The Xia dynasty had Yu, 
the Shang dynasty had Tang,
the Zhou dynasty had Wen and Wu; 
they are called the Three Kings.
The Xia handed the throne from father to son, 
starting a making a monarchy system.
After four hundred years, the Xia ended.
….
King Wu of the Zhou dynasty 
slew the Shang emperor Zhou Dixin.
And established the Zhou dynasty, 
which lasted eight hundred years;
the longest dynasty ever.
When the Zhou made tracks eastwards, 
the royal bond loosened, 
shields and spears flaunted, 
wandering advisers held in high esteem. 
Beginning with the Spring and Autumn Period 
it ended with the Warring States Period. 
….
The Qin of the Ying clan, 
started to annex all the states. 
The throne passed for two generations, 
and Chu and Han contended.
Gaozu rose, and the Han dynasty ruled.
….
The power of the eunuchs unchecked; 
bandits flourished like a forest
Li Chuang revolted, divine artefacts burned.
The great ancestor of the Qing 
received destiny’s call; 
Peace flourished in the four directions, 
thus achieving great stability.
The twenty one histories are complete.
They record government disorder;
 and unveil prosperity and decline.
Read the history books, examine the records,
connect the ancient with the present, 
and you’ll be as close as an eyewitness.1 
This synopsis of the general history of China, in an 
enumeration of the successive dynasties, although mostly 
factual, was obviously revised and updated during the 
Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1911). The lines about 
the Qing dynasty try hard to justify its invasion and 
subsequent minority rule by emphasizing the Confucian 
concept of “the Mandate of Heaven” and their role to 
maintain peace and stability. Historically, it was true that 
under the Manchu rule in the Qing dynasty, there was 
a tendency to place more emphasis on Confucianism 
as orthodoxy. Naturally they liked to paint themselves 
as the genuine heir and defender of the true tradition 
of the Chinese culture, hence legitimising themselves 
as successor of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The 
Manchu rulers were more fearful of intellectual ferment 
and ideological change than the Han Chinese literati. 
There was no room for anyone to challenge the orthodox 
Confucian view of history. 
When pupils (notably boys only) finished the three 
most elementary primers, the Three Character Classic, 
the Hundred Family Names and the Thousand Character 
Essay, their literacy level was high enough to enable 
them to read classic Chinese novels. One of the most 
well known of these novels was Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms (Sanguo yanyi), traditionally attributed to Luo 
Guanzhong (1315–1400) in the late Yuan to the early 
Ming periods. Consisting of 800,000 words, nearly a 
thousand dramatic characters in 120 episodes, it is written 
partly in vernacular and partly in classical Chinese. The 
author made use of available historical records, which 
covered the political upheavals from the Yellow Turban 
Rebellion in 184 AD up to the amalgamation of the three 
kingdoms under the Jin dynasty in 280 AD. 
Like most traditional novels and stories, Romance 
of the Three Kingdoms was mostly history-based. The 
lasting appeal of this genre is evidenced by the number of 
the plays based on these novels in the traditional theatre, 
which were retold by storytellers, the one-man theatre 
and enjoyed by adults and children, educated or illiterate. 
Traditionally in dynastic periods, the majority of the 
Chinese population were illiterate, and it was through the 
street theatre that they gained knowledge about their past 
and strong historical consciousness was maintained in this 
way. But, is their knowledge of history obtained through 
the street theatre reliable?
We estimate that, approximately, Romance of the 
Three Kingdoms consists of 70% history and 30% non-
history. The “non-history” parts have different sources, 
besides unofficial historical records and folk stories; some 
were created by the author. Nonetheless, the description 
of the social conditions that the author made and the logic 
1 Our own translation. For the original and annotations, see Wu Meng, 1991, pp.47-75.
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that the author used to solve the problems that arise in the 
plot is accurate to the Three Kingdoms period, creating 
“believable” situations and characters, even if they are 
not historically accurate. Notably, the historical research 
that went into producing Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
is a rarity amongst narratives and plays of this genre, as 
most of them were almost entirely fictional, based on thin 
threads of actual history. 
These days, education levels in China are a lot 
higher than ever before, and so thus is the literacy rate. 
The curriculum is modern. History is taught in primary 
and secondary schools. But the official history, be it 
Confucian or Communist, is always inclined to be 
dominated by the official ideology, and therefore history 
functions as an instrument to consolidate the legitimacy 
of the government (Bi, 2012). This element is central to 
the understanding of the official Chinese historiography, 
which can never be described as neutral. Whoever controls 
the compilation of history basically has the right to decide 
who was a hero, and who was a villain. In Chinese history, 
almost every dynasty won its power through some kind 
of devious means. The rulers of dynastic China, just like 
their present-day successors, were particularly concerned 
with how they would be portrayed in history. They took a 
strong interest in how the record of the past was compiled 
and how the future record of the present was kept. So 
historical compilations can be extremely sensitive, and 
consequently, elements of distortion are not uncommon, 
especially in the more recent history of that country. 
It is far too sweeping to generalise that none of the 
historical books written in China are reliable. In fact, the 
Chinese official record keepers, especially in the early 
part of Chinese history (3000–85 BC), were known for 
their bravery to preserve faithful documentations. They 
received no immunity by virtue of their position. Some 
were decapitated for writing down the murders among 
royal family members in their power struggle to become 
the next king. Others even received “gifts” of a silken cord 
or a lump of raw opium from the emperor, thus conveying 
the imperial desire that they commit suicide for criticizing 
the emperor’s policy in the official record.   
In the long history of China, there have been numerous 
outstanding historians, and the most famous was Sima 
Qian (135–85 BC). Sima Qian’s father, Sima Tan, served 
the Han dynasty government from 140 BC to 105 BC, 
holding the office of the “Prefect of the Grand Scribes”, 
(Taishiling, also translated as “Great Historian”). Among 
his duties were the supervision of sacrifices and of 
calendars, the investigation of astrological questions and 
taking care of the Imperial Library. He also collected 
historical records, thereby laying the foundation for the 
work of his son. Sima Qian was already well versed in 
old writings at the age of ten, and at the age of twenty he 
set out on a major journey through the empire. He visited 
the reputed graves of the ancient sage kings and studied 
in the hometown of Confucius. Upon his return, he served 
as a palace attendant. Upon his father’s death, Sima Qian 
inherited his office and took on an ambitious project 
started by his father – the production of the first full 
history of China, the Shiji (Historical Records). This broad 
ranging work extended over 130 chapters covering various 
aspects of history, such as annals, chronicles, treatises (on 
music, ceremonies, calendars, religion, and economics) 
and extended biographies. In this way, the grand history 
book covers the period from the five sages of prehistoric 
times, through the Xia, Shang, Zhou, and Qin dynasties to 
the Han dynasty of Sima Qian’s own time, laying down the 
foundations for historiography in China. His influence is 
evident in Chinese history books, including the elementary 
readers for children as shown above. Archaeological 
evidence has also confirmed some of Sima Qian’s claims. 
The Shiji and other chronologies compiled before and 
during Sima Qian’s time have proved to be amazingly 
precise. For example, they have been verified by checking 
the eclipses and sightings of comets recorded in them 
against what mathematical calculations conclude that they 
must have occurred. By 444 BC, Chinese astronomers 
had calculated the length of a year to be 365¼ days, a 
remarkable achievement given the technology of the 
times. Halley’s Comet was observed regularly in China 
from 240 BC on (Dreyer, 2010, p.26-27).
2 .   W H A T  I S  T H E  R E L A T I O N 
BETWEEN HISTORY AND POLITICS IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA?
In China, the study of history is not a detached academic 
pursuit and it is indistinguishable from politics. Chinese 
political leaders cannot adopt a disinterested approach 
towards history, distant or contemporary, as it intrudes 
too closely to their current political space. History has to 
be forced, if necessary, into servicing the present politics. 
Often, the value of history is judged by its usefulness as 
a guide to current circumstances. For example, MAO 
Zedong constantly turned to a thousand-year-old historical 
account, Zizhi tongjian (The Comprehensive Mirror to Aid 
in Government), for guidance on the policies he should 
follow in twentieth century China. 
Moreover, a traditional way to undermine a political 
adversary, especially those in power, was not by 
direct criticism, but by linking his actions, policies or 
circumstances to well-known cases in the past. This was 
a very potent weapon in Chinese politics. Given such a 
tradition, historians in China were extremely cautious to 
avoid trouble caused by their unintended hints, suspected 
by the political authorities. Nevertheless, persecutions 
against historians were a frequent occurrence, for no 
reason other than the interpretation of their publications 
as hidden attack on the political leaders. The best example 
to illustrate this point is the case of WU Han and his play 
HAI Rui Dismissed from the Office.
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WU Han (1909–1969) was one of the most important 
historians in the development of modern historical 
scholarship in China, particularly through his works of the 
1930s and 1940s. After 1949, he also served as Deputy 
Mayor of Beijing. In November 1965, at the start of the 
Cultural Revolution, he came under severe attack for his 
play about an upright Ming dynasty official, HAI Rui 
(1514–1587). WU Han wrote a series of articles on the 
life of HAI Rui published in the 1950s. In 1960, his play 
HAI Rui Dismissed from Office became a great success. 
MAO Zedong suspected this play of being an indirect 
condemnation of his removal of the former Defence 
Minister Peng Dehuai, who had criticized Mao’s Great 
Leap Forward policy in 1959. The consequence was 
devastating. Just like under the dynastic rule, WU Han died 
in prison, as did his wife, a fellow historian specialized 
in Ming dynasty history. Their daughter couldn’t escape 
persecution either, and eventually died at the age of twenty-
two. The persecution involved all WU Han’s relatives 
and friends, and many died. Meanwhile, some historians, 
most likely pressured by the government, came out to 
write and publish their research on Hai Rui, concluding 
that he had never been an honest and upright official, but 
a hypercritical reactionary official. Hai Rui’s tomb in his 
hometown Haikou was subsequently destroyed.
Shortly after MAO Zedong’s death in 1976, WU Han’s 
innocence was declared, as was his wife’s and all those 
involved. Peng Dehuai was exonerated. Hai Rui’s tomb was 
rebuilt, and a new monument was erected in Haikou. History 
as well as history compilation repeated exactly the same 
way in the past thousands of years. The emperor can never 
be denounced, and it is always the woman beside him to be 
blamed for his wrong doings. Mao’s widow was arrested 
and sentenced to death, later reduced to life imprisonment. 
Mao’s huge portrait is still hung on the gate of Tiananmen. 
His head appears in the China’s bank note as the founding 
father of the People’s Republic. The Chinese Communist 
Party-government does not wish historians to research 
cases like WU Han’s. They have a slogan, “Xiangqiankan 
– Looking forward”. Still, an obvious question, from the 
perspective of a historian remains unanswered: What was 
WU Han’s real intention of writing a historical play HAI 
Rui Dismissed from Office? He would be thought a lot more 
courageous if it had been indeed an allegorical work with the 
upright official representing the disgraced former Defence 
Minister Peng Dehuai for his outspoken criticism of Mao’s 
disastrous Great Leap Forward, and the unapproachable 
emperor representing Mao.
3 .   H O W  M U C H  D O  O U T S I D E 
RESEARCHERS KNOW ABOUT CHINA’S 
PAST?
Historical research and writing on China is highly 
developed in Japan, Russia, especially in the former 
Soviet Union, and in the West, predominantly in the 
USA. American research has produced some outstanding 
scholarship and a momentous outcome. Among these 
outstanding American scholars is John King Fairbank, 
who established what is known in the circle of historians 
as the “Harvard school” of China historiography. The 
Cambridge History of China is the largest and most 
comprehensive and authoritative history of China in the 
English language at the very least, and arguably in all 
languages including Chinese. Planned in the 1960s by 
the late Professor Fairbank of Harvard, Denis Twitchett, 
Professor Emeritus of Princeton, the series covers the 
grand scale of Chinese history from the 3rd century 
BC to the death of MAO Zedong. Consisting of fifteen 
volumes, the history embodies both existing scholarship 
and extensive original research into hitherto neglected 
subjects and periods. The contributors, all specialists from 
the international community of Sinologists, cover the main 
developments in political, social, economic and intellectual 
life of China in their respective periods. Collectively they 
present the major events in a long history that encompasses 
both a very old civilization and a great modern power. 
Consequently, the published volumes have constituted 
being an, if not the essential readings of Chinese history.  
During the Japanese occupation of parts of China 
from 1931 to 1945, Tokyo’s growing belief that Japan 
and China had a joint future as Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere led to the rapid development of a deep 
interest in Chinese affairs among government officials and 
academics. This interest continued even after the Japanese 
defeat in the World War II. By the early 1970s, Japan 
could reasonably claim to possess a fuller collection of 
sources on Chinese history in the twentieth century than 
China’s own collection. 
Russia’s collection of sources is also considerable, 
although narrowly concentrated in one aspect – an 
important one – the history of the Chinese Communist 
Party. Their archives are full of exciting files and 
revealing documents of the CCP leaders and their secret 
communications with the USSR.
Naturally, all these interested foreign parties, the West 
(predominantly the USA), Japan and Russia have tended 
to interpret Chinese history from their own point of view. 
Sometimes, they have been preoccupied with the concern 
to explain or justify their own record or involvement rather 
than to produce an objective account, especially in regard 
to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ history 
of China. There is always a serious “approach” issue, 
and hence many debates. The traditional and dominating 
theory of Harvard school of China historiography 
under John King Fairbank, with its hallmarks of the 
conceptual framework of “impact-response” approach, 
attracted harsh criticism from the mid-1980s, for being 
one of “ethnocentric distortion”, which emphasized that 
“the West – our West – has played a direct and vitally 
important part in recent Chinese history” (Cohen, 1984, 
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p.1). The “impact-response” paradigm and its amplified 
variation, the “tradition-modernity” paradigm (both being 
suffused with the same basic assumptions about China 
and the Wes), tend to depict China as passive and the 
West as active, portraying China as a “traditional society 
stuck in the past”, capable of being stirred up from its 
eternal repose only by the “life-giving force of a dynamic 
and modern West”, who “plays Beauty to China’s Beast, 
transforming by its kiss the torpor of centuries, releasing 
with its magical power the potential for ‘development’ 
that must otherwise remain forever locked up” (Cohen, 
p.151-152). Paul Cohen (1984), formerly trained under 
Fairbank at Harvard, argues in favour of a new approach, 
characterized by “a vigorous effort to see the history of 
any given non-Western society in its own terms and from 
its own point of view rather than as an extension – actual 
or conceptual – of Western history” (p.7).
Cohen’s argument is not that the actual Western 
historical role was unimportant in China’s process of 
modernisation, but rather that it has been blown out of 
proportion in comparison with other factors, and is hence 
misstated. Both the overstatement and misstatement are 
largely the consequence of the conceptual paradigms with 
which Western scholars have approached China and her 
history. Furthermore, Cohen maintains that the problem 
with “impact-response” approach is not that it is wrong, 
but it is that it has a limited range of applicability – it “can 
account for some things, but it cannot…tell the whole story” 
(p.11-12). He points out that changes or adjustments in 
some areas were clearly and unambiguously responses to or 
consequences of Western presence. These areas include such 
diverse phenomena such as treaty ports, sending students 
overseas to study modern arsenals and shipyards, Christian 
converts, institutions like Zongli yamen (the foreign affairs 
department of the government), Maritime Customs Service, 
and dispatch diplomatic envoys abroad. The last three could 
be seen as an evidence of the Chinese adjustment to the new 
Western idea of a modern nation-state.
Located in the innermost area of Chinese society 
and culture were those facets that were not the products 
of the Western presence, including the tradition of the 
social responsibility of intellectuals, especially at time 
of crises, who contributed, possibly in decisive ways, 
to the change in modern Chinese history, through their 
continuous search for social and ideological remedies 
mainly from, but not limited to, the West (Bi, 2012). 
These intercultural influences came from the West, 
Japan, Russian Bolsheviks, and other places like India – 
Rabindranath Tagore. If Yan Fu (1854–1921, also spelt as 
Yen Fu) being sent to Britain to study the navy technology 
at the Navy Academy in Greenwich from 1877 to 1879 
is seen as a Manchu Qing government’s passive response 
to the Western impact of the Opium War to modernise 
its national defence, then his return to China with the 
theory of social Darwinism ought be viewed as a Chinese 
intellectuals’ active initiative to modernise thinking.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
For historians to put their thoughts into writings, there 
must be proof behind their thoughts. In other words, the 
tales historians spin are only as sound as their foundational 
evidence. What follows is just like Benedetto Croce’s 
(1966) description: the tale and the fact become mingled 
and the fact now takes on an additional richness. As time 
passes, the narrations and judgments made by historians 
themselves become facts or “documents” requiring to be 
interpreted and judged – “History is never based upon 
narrations but always upon documents – it may be upon 
narrations reduced to the status of documents, and used as 
such” (Croce, p.497-498). 
The most important feature of the new approach put 
forward by Cohen is to reduce ethnocentric distortion to 
a minimum, accounting for the fact that eliminating all 
such distortion is almost impossible. In the process, we 
are “freeing ourselves to see Chinese history in a new, 
less Western centred ways”, moving towards a China-
centred approach (p. 153-154). But, the problem with 
Cohen’s “China-centred approach”, as discussed so far, 
is that Chinese historiography is itself either Confucian 
or Communist, lacking impartiality and neutrality. Since 
critical work is always informed by the writer’s own 
ideologies, as mentioned above, any historical inquiry can 
never be absolutely objective. Thus, objectivity is more 
likely to be achieved in a liberal academic environment 
outside China, where access to materials of different 
political stands is the norm. Such an environment 
encourages the establishment of a detached approach 
required of any serious study. How to establish a 
“Chinese experience-based” approach while maintaining 
“impartiality and neutrality” is still the biggest question 
for those who teach and research Chinese history.
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